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Abstract
This study examines the trading activity of a large cross section of American bank
holding companies upon various sub-events associated with the introduction of Basel III.
An event study methodology was applied to various sub-composite portfolios, as
determined by regulatory capitalization and leverage ratios. The results suggest that
statically significant abnormal negative returns occurred on the announcement to
negotiate due to heightened regulatory uncertainty, especially amongst the least
capitalized and highest leveraged banks. However, this effect is complemented by
statically significant positive returns upon the release of the initial guidelines. Reactions
to subsequent events report to be less significant.
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I. Introduction
American Bank Holding Companies (BHC) were high volatility assets during the
2008 financial crisis—both in enterprise value and reputational credence. With the
detrimental defaults of financial institution heavyweights such as Lehman Brothers and
Washington Mutual, banking regulations clearly needed updated guidelines. In the wake
of this crisis, both bankers and investors stood by for answers—ones that could not be
addressed in the course of a day, a month, or even a year. The Basel Committee for Banking
Supervision (BCBS) ignited a process to overhaul the legacy banking regulatory
framework.
Regulators from member nations entered into negotiations that would incorporate
competing domestic agendas, of which the United States presented a key tenant. The
American banking landscape is varied, diverse, and vast. Although much of the focus of
the financial crisis fixated on various “too big to fail” institutions, every institution now
took on a high degree of regulatory risk. Investors were forced to scan the field of possible
data and adjust valuations accordingly.
Our study examines five distinct sub-events associated with the unveiling of Basel
III. The results suggest that the value of BHC’s declined following the announcement of
new regulation. However, as the details of the regulations become known, investors realize
the incoming competitive advantages of existing American regulatory stringency. Overall,
banks appear to have benefitted from the reactions to Basel III.
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II. Background
Institutional and Regulatory Background
In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the BCBS synthesized the economic
disaster as to update necessary capitalization and liquidity requirements. The committee
produced the single most “complete overhaul of U.S. bank capital standards since the U.S.
adoption of Basel I in 1989” (Davis, Polk, & Wardell Visual Memo, 4). The banking accord
strived to push regulatory framework in line with the relative risk of the global markets.
Financial institutions’ enterprise values were directly affected by the ruling, with only
certain excepted savings and loan holding companies and BHC’s not being strictly held to
the guidelines.1 This piece of regulation forever perverted the course of banking.
Basel III follows its original foundation of Basel I and its logical reorganization,
Basel II. The construction and unveiling of lasting financial regulation cannot simply be
released in the course of a single day, but rather the unfolding of the final rules is comprised
of various major sub-events. Table 1 chronicles these sub-events, but also provides insight
into the publically available information for each corresponding date.2 The sub-events
chosen for this study fall in line with those used in previous case studies, for consistency
(Wilf 2013, 13). These sub-events each prompted various degrees of equity valuation
speculation as investors developed a deeper understanding for the direction of regulation.
Accordingly, these “surprise” press releases unleashed mixed trading sentiment across the
financial services landscape (Wilf 2013, 29-32). The BCBS operates with a veiled privacy
1

Refer to the Davis Polk & Wardell Visual Memo for more information on those few banks not forced to
comply with Basel III
2
See http://www.bis.org/list/press_releases/index.htm for a complete list of Basel III press releases
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in attempt to ensure a competitive banking marketplace (Zaring 1998, 287-290). The
details of discussion topics are never publically discussed. Rather information is
transmitted through press releases. The releases vary in their timing, as the BCBS has
sometimes opted to release details the same day as deliberations or released information
weeks after formal meetings have concluded.
The corresponding event-based trading rests in the uncertainty surrounding BCBS
meetings. The economic significance of these events is predicated upon their result
remaining fundamentally unknown. Hence, the fact that the BCBS participants actively
negotiate on behalf of their constituents legitimizes their effects on the markets with a semistrong or weak form of the efficient market hypothesis (Wilf 2013, 15).3 Sheila Bair, the
US FDIC Chairman throughout the Basel III negotiations declared that the deliberations
were decidedly fragmented in regards to the US banking landscape, as many of the largest
financial interests found themselves in wildly varied capital and liquidity positions as a
result of the residential credit crunch (Bair 2012, 257-272). Hence, the press releases
should be considered an introduction of legitimate new public information, as opposed to
the confirmation of previously accepted information.
Basel III’s Impact
An essential component to this landmark regulation is its treatment of institutions
with inequity—the capitalization guidelines will theoretically be calibrated with the
perceived riskiness of an institution. Not all banks are regulated equally. Nor is it correct

3

Wilf posits that active negotiation is absent in G-20 summits, the content of which is widely
preunderstood.
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to suggest that Basel III’s predecessors did not attempt to adjust for riskiness with respect
to setting appropriate calibration levels of regulatory capital. Basel III would ideally bring
financial institutions back aligned with the perceived riskiness of the global markets. Banks
are assigned acceptable guidelines as dictated by their risk profile: asset composition,
capitalization, consolidated asset value, systemic importance, etc. All of which, in some
form, are considered when judging regulatory compliance.
Basel III overhauled the procedure for calculating risk-based capital ratios
(RBCR). The basic components of any RBCR are as follows:
𝑅𝐵𝐶𝑅 =

𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 − 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠

The new legislation, on the whole, requires higher minimum RBCR’s, as well as
incentivizes banks to maintain capital buffers in excess of minimum requirements to avoid
capital distribution lockups, penalties, and suspension of executive bonuses (Davis, Polk,
& Wardell Visual Memo, 21). It tightened the eligibility for adequate regulatory capital
instruments, as well as adjusted the constitution of tangible common equity. One of the
most significant developments of the deployment of Basel III for the recalculation of riskweighted assets (RWA). The accord generally marked up the risk-weighted value of OTC
derivatives, cleared derivatives, high volatility commercial real estate loans, certain home
equity exposures, and the majority of securitizations. Accordingly, higher assigned RWA
values will render higher degrees of regulatory capital held against it. As banks are forced
to comply with the capital guidelines, available leverage and profitability instruments
become constrained, and thus banks must idiosyncratically forge their own. (Davis, Polk,
& Wardell Visual Memo, 20). The asset composition of respective banks will ultimately
4

play integral roles in the costs associated with current and future compliance. The exact
effect of such will be discussed later in this paper.
Not all banking organizations are subject to the same guidelines. For example,
banks satisfying any of the following criteria must adopt the advanced approach to
capitalization: greater than $250 billion of total consolidated assets, greater than $10 billion
of on-balance sheet foreign exposures, or elects to do so with federal banking regulatory
approval. The advanced approach sets separate guidelines for calculating RWA’s for those
qualified banks. The equity-related regulatory transition between previous and the Basel
III final guidelines is outlined in Figure 1 (Davis, Polk, & Wardell Visual Memo, 7, 21).
The new rules built upon the previously-established two-tier system. A four percent tier 1
equity ratio and a four percent tier 2 equity ratio for all banking institutions—a decidedly
less elegant solution to financial and systemic risk management than its successor. The
Basel III rule applies the globally-systemically important bank holding company
surcharges to an internally determined list of banks with high enough counterparty risk to
the global markets to warrant additional capital coverage. However, the Basel III final rule
failed to outline the proposals for this additional surcharge, of which the final enforceability
is more ambiguous. The common equity tier 1 countercyclical buffer only applies to banks
adopting the advanced approach to risk-weighting and minimums are calibrated on a scaled
for size and asset composition basis (Davis, Polk, & Wardell Visual Memo, 7, 20-21).
The Anatomy of Capital Ratios
Regulatory capitalization fails to protect against expected losses. It is precisely
intended for the opposite—to safeguard the economy from experiencing unexpected
5

banking losses with contagion potential to not only destroy value within the financial
institution space but in peripheral industries as well. Traditional balance sheet items prove
helpful in determining the financing strategy of a bank. Yet, it is important to note the
limitations of such measures as book value of shareholder’s equity, as it fails to convey the
solvency of the institution. The book value of shareholder’s equity theoretically functions
as a proxy for the firm’s asset value to eclipse liabilities—hence the residual value of the
firm. Narrowly defined, this can be solely constituted as retained earnings and common
stock. Logically, there exist little nexus between total book equity and solvency, although
the link is not entirely absent.
Regulatory capital attempts to disclose a financial institutions’ economic health by
providing more narrowly defined conceptions of capital—that which can be used to pay
creditors in the event of insolvency. It highlights and manipulates relevant balance sheet
items to create proxies from which investors may draw conclusions about the bank’s
financing strategy more transparently than possible using just basic EDGAR financial
statements (Tarullo 2008, 265). Narrowly defined capital comprises Tier 1. It can be easily
deployed to settle financial / cash obligations less ambiguously than its broader-defined
counterpart, Tier 2 capital. One of Basel III’s most impactful changes to the regulatory
landscape is the call for additional capital tiers beyond the existing framework. As capital
becomes increasingly narrowly defined, banks will be forced to adjust their financing
strategies to comply with the ruling—a costly endeavor. However, the understanding that
these costs be somewhat evenly distributed across the industry is misleading. Any given
BHC’s financing and business strategy will inevitably inform the firm’s options for moving
into compliance.
6

In addition to the imposition of narrowly-defined regulatory capital, Basel III
reevaluated the means of calculating RWA’s. These calculations discount or assign
premiums to certain assets in an attempt to convey their operational capabilities in the event
of insolvency, as well as the likelihood of experiencing unexpected losses (Tarullo 2008,
111). The safest of assets (cash, guaranteed loans, synthetically-protected credits, etc.) can
be risk-weighted as low as 0%, while more risky assets (highly leveraged credits, high
volatility real estate) can be held at 100%. As a result, banks would be forced to hold an
equity position that scales upwards with risk—dampening the profitability magnification
of leverage. Basel III would ultimately assign some asset (certain OTC derivatives, equity
exposures, unsettled transactions) risk weights well in excess of 100%, often as high as
1250%—making the imposition of complementary equity holdings wildly costly (Davis,
Polk, & Wardell, Risk Weights Tool).

Hence, the current capitalization and asset

composition of banks will be affected in ways that are completely dependent on the final
rulings, and small changes in such rules will yield mixed results for seemingly similar US
BHC’s.

7

III. Literature Review
There exists a critical mass of literature which examines equity returns of financial
institutions across global markets upon the announcement of Basel III and its sub-events.
Several additional papers proved relevant to this paper’s focus, as aspects of event studies
chronicling equity returns for other financial regulatory fixtures, such as dividend and
accounting policies, expounded some helpful analytical tools. Regardless of the focus,
economists examined financial institution trading activity in attempt to highlight or dispel
rumors of abnormal returns over a prudent time horizon.
Before we can examine Basel III’s impact on equity returns, it is helpful to establish
the sentiment surrounding the broader financial regulatory landscape throughout this
tumultuous point in time. Nine major pieces of regulation forged the observable set of
events for Shafer (2013). The study examined Dodd-Frank, the Volcker Rule, Vickers
Commission rulings, and Basel III, amongst others. Equity returns and CDS spreads of the
largest European and US BHC’s were tested for abnormal returns, as compared against the
market index—to which the results were mixed. The market responded most radically to
structural reforms, such as the Volcker rule and the Vickers Regime, although these effects
appear to dampen with wider trading windows, suggesting that pending financial regulation
disruption in the market is minor (Shafer 2013, 26-31).
The events comprising the Basel III portion of the analysis also yielded mixed
results. Basel III resulted in abnormal negative returns for US banks in regard to only a few
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of the sub-events, yet did not produce abnormal returns for British, Swiss, and German
banks. Most importantly, equity valuations slid for US banks on announcement of
meetings, however saw no such change upon announcement of the new capital
requirements. The European banks did not flinch at the formation and announcement of
Basel III over 80 and 140 day trading windows, decisively longer than our study (Shafer
2013, 26-29).
Wilf (2013) adopted an alternative approach to determining the existence of
abnormal returns for the largest US BHC’s. En route, the study attempts to dispel rumors
that banks kneaded the framework of Basel III in order to preserve firm value at the expense
of global financial stability. Wilf accomplished this feat through comparing cumulative
abnormal returns of each of the 45 largest US BHC’s with a bespoke counterfactual index.
She identified a portfolio of non-financial firms whose trading activities historically
correlate with that of each specific financial firm. On aggregate, the net effect of Basel III
yielded negative abnormal cumulative returns, though these returns failed to be consistent
across all sub-events (Wilf 2013, 29-32). This study employed a larger trading window
and focused on large-scale distributional effects of the regulation, as opposed to immediate
investor reaction. This study failed to further breakdown the composition of the firms
receiving the most robust abnormal returns, but rather questioned the credibility of the
regulation, as speculators grew skeptical of the implementation of an international banking
accord within a contentious domestic banking environment. Accordingly, Wilf discovered
that investors deemed the regulatory framework as credible and affecting of bank equity
value (Wilf 2013, 33).

9

In light of Wilf’s recent discovery on behalf of US banks, Bruno (2014) examined
Europe’s bank equity returns throughout the formation of Basel III. Although this study
employed a more traditional event study methodology, it unveiled negative cumulative
abnormal returns in anticipation of regulatory triggers. Moreover, banks across Europe
failed to react homogeneously, as banks considered core members of the Eurozone
witnessed outsized returns as compared to their counterparts on the geopolitical outskirts
(Bruno 2014, 22-25). In addition to geopolitical orientation, this study identified trends in
liquidity and capitalization, as it became clear that more liquid banks saw larger abnormal
negative returns as compared to less liquid banks. Yet, banks with higher tier 1 capital
ratios saw larger negative cumulative returns than those less well capitalized (Bruno 2014,
29).
Some of the relevant literature focuses on accounting discretion of banks in the
midst of the crisis. Huizinga and Laeven (2009) employed Tobin’s q, a useful metric to
measure discounts and premiums associated with banking assets. Let MV be the market
value of the bank, while Ai be the accounting value of the asset i and let Li be the accounting
value of the liability i. As such, we can express the market value of the firm as below4:
MV = ∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑎 𝐴𝑖 − ∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑙 𝐿𝑖

4

For the original exposition of Tobin’s q, reference Tobin (1969)
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where 𝑣𝑖𝑎 is the market value of the asset i and 𝑣𝑖𝑙 is the market value of the liability i.5
Thus, we may define q as the market value of equity of the bank plus the book value of all
liabilities divided by book value of all assets as below:

𝑞=

𝑀𝑉 + ∑ 𝐿𝑖
∑ 𝐴𝑖

Basic substitution yields:
𝑞 = 1 − ∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑎 𝑎𝑖 + ∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑙 𝑙𝑖
Where 𝑑𝑖𝑎 = 1 − 𝑣𝑖𝑎 , 𝑑𝑖𝑙 = 1 − 𝑣𝑖𝑙 , 𝑎𝑖 =

𝐴𝑖
,
∑ 𝐴𝑖

and 𝑙𝑖 =

𝐿𝑖
.
∑ 𝐴𝑖

Accordingly, 𝑑𝑖𝑎 and 𝑑𝑖𝑙 denote

discounts implicit in the bank’s equity pricing of the firm’s underlying assets and liabilities
relative to book value. Should the assets and liabilities be valued precisely at market value,
q = 1. Any such perversion would imply that the market valuation of at least a single asset
or liability differs from accounting value (Huizinga and Laevan 2009, 7-8).

5

DeYoung and Yon (2008) discuss that this measure ignores the fact that market value may be sensitive to
the co-mingling of certain assets and liabilities (DeYoung and Yon 2008, 18-24)
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IV. Hypothesis
Development
The inspiration for this study began in the summer of 2015, when I accepted a job
as an investment banking summer analyst within a global investment bank’s financing arm.
That summer was spent learning the language of Basel III and regulatory networks. The
contemporary salience of international banking accords appeals to my own interest in
overlaying conjectural debate upon a quantitative inquiry.
This study attempts to erode the mystique behind a number of fundamental
questions in regards to banking regulation. How did investors anticipate Basel III would
affect firm value? Did investors consider the BCBS’ measures enforceable, and would
regulators punish American banks due to their contribution to the crisis? In what ways
did the accord affect firm value differently across various American BHC profiles?
Previous studies have examined these fundamental questions across the entire industry,
however my time working as a practitioner made it evanescently clear that few banks
operate similarly. However the question of how exactly they trade remained unclear.
Capitalization presents just one of the many factors that influence future profitability, as
well as investor sentiment towards such.

12

Notional Discussion on Regulatory Networks
Singer (2004) discusses the conditions under which international regulatory
accords are implemented most harmoniously. The study posits that regulators often
actively resist international regulatory cooperation. However, in times of heightened
institutional pessimism regulators seek international harmonization as a means of quelling
domestic political pressures to achieve stability. Should Singer’s framework hold true in
this context, the extreme political pressure would catalyze cooperation to create a
regulatory landscape that both enables BCBS-elected countries to compete internationally,
but also satisfies domestic interests. Should investors deem this achievement
implementable, American BHC’s (or some subset thereof) will benefit from a combination
of reputational risk management and the rendering of a sustainable capital structure (Singer
2004, 531-533).
A critical component to understanding the conjectural debate of the origins of value
within international regulation rests in the bifurcation between public and private goods.6
The international banking accord can be examined as the first movement of codified bank
capital minimums as a global public goods provision in the form of providing private goods
for US BHC’s.7
The public goods perspective posits that international accords usher in an era of
heightened financial stability while maintaining competitive advantage across countries
(Kapstein 1989, 337-341). The appeal of financial stability to any regulator is intuitive.

6

Public good: non-rival, non-excludable. Private good: rival, excludable.
See Kapstein (1989) and Oatley and Nabors (1998) for a more complete explanation. These papers fixate
on Basel I, however the same conceptual framework applies to Basel III.
7
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Regulators prove their worth in balancing this imperative with domestic competitiveness.
This tradeoff between profitability and stability has since been dubbed the “regulator’s
dilemma” (Kapstein 1989, 323-324). Kapstein (1989) argues that cooperation amongst
regulators on international accords dampens this predicament, as it theoretically increases
financial stability while holding competitiveness relatively constant. As such, financial
stability is rendered a public good.
Oatley and Nabors (1998) argue that adopting a private goods perspective suggests
that heightened regulatory constraints increases the competiveness of firms in countries
with existing regulatory stringency. The introduction of international accords and their
subsequent implementation forces countries with lower existing regulatory stringency to
be held to a higher capitalization standard, with the inverse holding true for economic zones
with existing capital rules closer in line to the introduced augmentation (Oatley and Nabors
1998, 36-37) . Hence, the accord could provide a private benefit to certain profiles of banks
in disproportion to global competitors.
These competing views predict possible mixed results for US BHC’s. In the public
goods case, Wilf argues that US bank firm value would be adversely affected due to
compliance adjustment and operational repositioning costs (Wilf 2013, 7-11). The private
goods case would benefit US banks, as their competitive advantage of existing regulatory
stringency will be realized. The study performs lasso regressions on America’s largest
banks to render that the competing effects yield a net negative effect on firm value.
However, this strategy appears limiting in some regards. Projecting conclusions on the US
banking industry using equity returns of only the largest banks fails to fully expound the

14

effect of the regulation. Absolutely useful, but Wilf’s study strives to draw conclusions
about the banking system with these banks as proxies, while our study hopes to draw
conclusions using a cross section of the industry. With American BHC’s bolstering varying
existing capitalizations, the accord would affect banks asymmetrically—not just in market
capitalization, but across RBCR’s, risk-based leverage ratios, and others metrics with
similar implications.
Due to Basel III’s predecessors, the enforceability of the accord will likely not be
challenged. Yet, the component documents of the rules are remarkably detailed, with the
ultimate penalties being somewhat muddled beyond that of reputational risk (Davis, Polk,
& Wardell Visual Memo, 21). The ruling forces investors to synthesize its contents,
whether it be in analysis or in anticipation and adjust their conception of firm value
accordingly. Hence, Basel III’s granularity will likely affect US banks on the industry level,
but perhaps more definitively according to their capitalization characteristics. This study
strives to gauge investor sentiment in the extreme short term.
The Hypothesis
This study will test the existence of abnormal returns for various portfolios of US
BHC’s equity returns. These abnormal returns will be considered a reality when a
statistically significant residual (either positive or negative) value is discovered in excess
of the expected trading path for that day. Hence, a generalized least squares (GLS)
augmented fixed effects estimator will be employed to detect abnormal returns.
The regression analysis will utilize binary dummy variables to the effect that the
corresponding constant will encapsulate pricing movements for banks in the examined
15

portfolio. Statistically significant positive constants would suggests banks in that portfolio
have experienced firm value appreciation due to the corresponding events. The regulatory
effects of a private good operates as the prominent distributional agent. The inverse holds
for negative returns, as the public good effect has influenced investors to discount firm
value. It is understood that the various sub-events will not yield similar results, as the
volatile 15 months en route to the final ruling inevitably fostered competing viewpoints
about the overall health of the banking sector (Dow 2010, 1-5).
In light of the available information set and previous literature, the following forms
the fundamental platform of hypothesis the empirical analysis will address to demonstrate
the ways Basel III affected firms with various capitalization characteristics.
Hypothesis 1: The cumulative effect of the accord will ultimately be accretive to firm value.
Hypothesis 2: The initial investor reaction will negatively affect firm value due to
regulatory uncertainty or expected punitive, noncompetitive capital measures.
Hypothesis 3: The limited release of the proposals will yield positive abnormal returns
due to the elimination of some degree of regulatory risk, especially amongst the least wellcapitalized BHC’s.
Hypothesis 4: Subsequent events will garner far less effect on firm value, both cumulatively
and within certain characteristic groups, as investors synthesized the existing information
set to conceptualize the lasting constraint of Basel III within the BHC space.

16

V. Empirical Analysis
Data
We obtained daily closing stock and index prices using S&P Capital IQ for the
period February 1st 2004 through January 31th of 2011 for the informational purposes of
our study. The hypothesis testing focused on heterogeneous investment reactions to BCBS
announcements in regards to Basel III’s final rules. Accordingly, financial statement and
regulatory statement data was aggregated at the firm-wide level. S&P Capital IQ proved
adequate in obtaining such data by using the industry-specific module to leverage FR 9YC forms filed publically through the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council’s
National Information Center. This study relies heavily on both daily market returns and
quarterly regulatory filings. Quarterly regulatory measures are assumed to remain constant
throughout their relevant quarter, and no anticipatory changes were made. The implication
of this method is regulatory capitalization was assumed to be constant throughout a period,
while market capitalization fluctuates.
As this study’s focus remains bank capitalization’s relationship with returns, bank
selection became vital. Banks were not excluded from the selection pool on the basis of
total consolidated assets or equity value, except for those whose values fell outside of Basel
III’s applicability. The sample began with a list of 176 publically traded American BHC’s.
Banks became ineligible for the sample should banking activities be determined to fall
outside of its core competency or if the information set became incomplete at any point
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during the data collection period.8 The final sample consisted of 113 banks, all of which
contained the full information set and is listed on Table 2.
Our study broke down the prevailing banks into various buckets, depending on the
statistical test being performed. Regulatory data was used to generate leverage and capital
ratios, including tier 1 leverage ratio, tangible tier 1 leverage ratio, tier 1 risk-based capital
ratio, risk-weighted assets as a percentage of consolidated assets, and Tobin’s q was
generated using EDGAR and regulatory filings. Tier 2 risk-based capital ratio was
excluded from our sample due to incomplete information issues. Our study opted to
trifurcate each of the mentioned capitalization measures into three buckets. The sorting
criteria for each group is detailed in Table 3.
The process for determining the sub-events of the BCBS’ announcement of the
Basel III framework is as follows. The finalized list would only include actionable events
executed in regards to the Basel III framework. The BCBS maintains a robust newsfeed
from which all relevant publications are released. Publications filed under their Basel III
module, in addition to other relevant press releases, were examined for salience and gravity
of content. While the BCBS released numerous documents examining specific facets of
capitalization and liquidation in the wake of the financial crisis, this study selected
documents and releases dealing with the entire Basel III capitalization framework. The
trading window revolved around the ultimate release of relevant documents to the subevent, as opposed to the announcement of the BCBS meeting, as all BCBS meetings follow
a public schedule, however the contents of such remain immediately private, then are

8

Eligible events include a delisting, or failure to file an FR 9-YC as a component of BHC requirements.
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released at a later date. The three-day trading window begins on the day the documents are
released. This window is narrow by design as to capture the essence of investor reaction to
the regulation.
Bruno (2014). examined the credibility of the media anticipating the events of the
BCBS meeting in order to confirm that the released documents in fact disseminate new
information to the market. The study found that although media substantially covered the
topic, empirical analysis suggests that no such anticipation is apparent in the financial data
(Bruno 2014, 17-19). This discovery prompted our study to open the trading window on
document release, not days prior.
Methodology
The influence of Basel III sub-events on BHC public equity returns is examined
through an event study approach. The daily abnormal return for a security i on day t is as
follows:
𝐴𝑅 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖 𝑅𝑚𝑡 ) +∈𝑖
Where Rit is the holding period return of the equity on day t, Rmt is the holding period return
of a value-weighted index to reflect the market portfolio on day t, while 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 represent
the GLS estimates for equity i. The CAPM market model parameters are generated using
five years of trading data from the beginning of the observation period—August 2004-July
2009. ∈𝑖 is a stochastic error term. The estimation window ends prior to the opening of the
first trading window to prevent informational leakage into the observation period. For a
single stock, the average one-day abnormal return from day t to day t+n is as follows:
19

𝑛

𝑡+𝑛

𝑖=1

𝑖=𝑡

1
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡 = ∑ 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 ∀ 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑛

This study then applies a final term to the model of daily abnormal returns as such:
𝐴𝑅 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖 𝑅𝑚𝑡 ) + 𝛽𝑡 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 + 𝛽𝑗 𝐷𝑘 +∈𝑖
where 𝐷𝑘, represents a dummy variable that equals 1 for any bank which passes the criteria
for the given event day and capitalization group. The nature of the various criteria are
expounded later in this section. 𝛽𝑗 is the GLS estimator for the respective dummy variable.
Each of the five sub-events corresponds to an appropriate measure, which in turn generates
a new 𝛽𝑗 for a given trading window. 𝛽𝑡 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒

encapsulates a basic time-weighted

adjustment to break the day-to-day trading momentum effects in the observation period.
Any study attempting to measure the trading effects of landmark legislation must
also consider the cumulative wealth effect of the endeavor. Hence, did BHC’s stand to
realize or destroy value through the announcement of Basel III? To assess the overall
impact in a given trading window, we aggregate the CARs for either all events or a single
event (Wagster 1996, 1328-1331). We then operate z-score tests to assess the significance
of these returns where:

𝐻0 : ∑ 𝛽𝑗

= 0 ∀ 𝑗 = {1,2,3,4,5}

where 𝛽𝑗 is the coefficient on the dummy variable to the CAR for a corresponding event j.
We then isolate the variable in which regulatory details were released to attempt to
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separately understand the wealth effects of the actual legislation versus the signaling effect
of forthcoming regulation.
Assessing the cumulative wealth effects of landmark regulation presents statistical
turbidity. The ultimate goal of this study is not just to understand the effect of the unveiling
of Basel III, but also to unpack the effect of the sub-events on various BHC capitalization
profiles. The BHC’s were broken down to three distinct portfolios to identify groups that
are less, adequately, and more capitalized with respect to each of the relevant metrics. The
full list of calculated metric and the respective portfolio criterion are disclosed on TABLE
3. BHC’s are not restricted from switching portfolio grouping across events as to maintain
the integrity of contemporaneous effects of current capitalization. Hence, the number of
observations deviates between events and capitalization buckets. Trading effects for
respective capitalization groups were examined across all events and on a single-event
basis.
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VI. Results and General Discussion
The results of the regression analysis of a composite portfolio across all events is
displayed in Table 4 – Table 10. This composite portfolio holds an equally-weighted value
of all 113 BHC’s in this study, attempting to measure the cumulative effect across all
events, as well as event by event. The cumulative effect yields a slightly positive, statically
significant return at the ten percent level. The final cumulative effect posits that US BHC’s
stood to benefit from the introduction of Basel III. American banks reap the benefit of the
distributional effects of the accord’s private goods, as their competitive advantage as a
more-developed regulatory environment produces value in excess of international
competitors. Beyond the effects of the removal of financial uncertainty, investors unveiled
their sentiments towards a more stable financial system, as the introduction of additional
regulatory capital constraints will both decrease volatility and global earnings robustness.
Investors rendered the benefits of stability more accretive to value than the dampening of
future earnings in more advantageous economic climates, such as the US.
In order to render the means by which the regulation affected US BHC’s across the
sector, we must split the composite portfolio to several sub-composite portfolios and test
for abnormal returns. Banks sorted into each analysis’ third group experienced the most
frequent appreciation of equity pricing. Abnormal returns were detected in tier 1 leverage
ratio, tier 1 risk-based capital ratio, and Tobin’s q at the 10 percent level, and within
tangible tier 1 leverage ratio at the five percent level. The highest leveraged banks within
the various constitutions of group three benefitted from the introduction of Basel III, as it
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became understood that these banks will pivot towards compliance—generating
significantly less discounted earnings. BHC’s belonging to the various group twos also
experienced abnormal returns, with tangible tier 1 leverage ratio, tier 1 risk-based capital
ratio, and risk-weighted assets as a percentage of total consolidated assets also experiencing
abnormal returns. Moving farther up the capitalization chain, banks belonging to group one
only saw abnormal returns when testing against RWA’s as a percentage of total
consolidated assets, as banks holding what was currently considered higher-quality assets
should reap the competitive benefits of a private good in excess of the low cost of pivoting
towards compliance.
The announcement of the agreement between BCBS members to overhaul the
global banking regulatory framework saw extremely significant negative returns, as the
CAR over the observation window yielded a -.43% regression metric—rejecting our null
hypothesis of no abnormal returns. This adverse reaction most likely originates in investor
sentiment in regards to increased regulatory risk. Barring any outsized optimism in regards
to the ultimate benefits of the regulation, this reaction is expected. This expectation spurs
from such regulatory risk incorporating into cash flow valuations en route to rendering an
appropriate stock price. Put simply, event one can be viewed as spiking the associated
discount rates of firm-related equity cash flows, as all US BHC’s will be subject to the new
regulation at some point in the near or distant future (the enforceability timeline was
unknown at the time). Riskier cash flows translate to a lower equity value.
Being that the cumulative effect of event one yielded statically significant abnormal
negative returns, it remains logical that the majority of capitalization groups also
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experienced such returns. This logic is reflected in the results, however patterns of investor
reactions emerge. With heightened regulatory uncertainty, we would expect less wellcapitalized BHC’s to witness equity devaluation. Banks belonging to group two and group
three produced seven of the eight statistically significant negative return values. Banks with
higher tier 1 leverage ratios were negatively affected, however banks with lower tangible
tier 1 leverage ratios also experienced devaluation. Banks with high tangible leverage ratios
relative to basic leverage ratios report a higher percentage of assets being intangible—
hence having less value in a solvency event. In light of this, our result follows the logic
that investors punish banks who report high leverage, but curiously those with low tangible
leverage as well. This apparent logical schism between the treatments of these groups most
likely originates in investor skepticism towards the tangibility of such assets. Simply,
banks with the lowest tangible leverage ratios relative to basic leverage ratios are most
likely to have overstated the tangibility of their assets in the past, and Basel III would most
likely punish them for this overstatement. By the introduction of Basel III, many banks
had already taken massive intangible asset write-downs, and it appears investors might
anticipate more to follow. Similarly, statically significant negative returns were detected in
the groups with the highest Tobin’s q values. Investors recognize that previous reporting
practices might prompt investors to rethink past market premiums placed on assets or
liabilities. Assuming Basel III will punish banks with highest premiums on their assets,
investors reacted poorly to the announcement to negotiate.
Event two appears to erase the detrimental effects of the previous announcement.
The publication of select proposals on behalf of the BCBS offered investors the first flavor
of the regulation. Investors recognized that the forthcoming proposals would most likely
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be accretive to firm value. Hence, American banks will benefit from their existing system
atop the financial regulatory hierarchy.
Breaking the composite portfolio down to respective capitalization groups, patterns
emerge that are in some respects complementary to the announcement to negotiate. The
distributional effects of America’s current regulatory constraints will provide a meaningful
safeguard against the drawbacks of being undercapitalized. In fact, it appears that the
reactions put forth in the previous event was unjustified, as the release of select regulatory
details convinced investors that the most leveraged banks will benefit from the need to
comply with Basel III in excess of the costs. Less leveraged banks saw a far less significant
accretion of equity value. Those with the lowest RWA as a percentage of total consolidated
assets saw equity appreciation. Those with currently advantageous RWA constructions will
certainly be less affected than those banks with higher risk assets, as the recalculation of
RWA’s presented one of the key tenants of Basel III’s updates. Yet on the whole,
seemingly more aggressive banks saw appreciation due to the understanding that Basel III
will not destroy their viability beyond the benefits of a more-stable domestic banking
system. Put metaphorically, a rising financial tide will raise a boat much higher than
expected when the boat is perceived to be leakier than it is.
Event three comprised no statistically significant cumulative effect on the entire
composite portfolio. It saw the BCBS’ announcement of their settlement upon the final
rules, however the granular details of the revised rules were released at a later date. This
result suggests that investors failed to recognize the salience of this event on the ultimate
effect of bank valuation. The cumulative effect of this event fails to be statically significant
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at the ten percent level, yet is significant at a level just above it. As such, the cumulative
effect is not meaningless. The corresponding GLS estimator is decisively closer to 0 than
the previous two events months earlier. Event three showcases evidence of investor
disenchantment with the rulings, with cumulative effects beginning to dampen and
significant abnormal returns within sub-composite portfolios becoming more infrequent.
Subsequent events reflect a deepening of this sentiment and will be discussed later.
Event three witnessed statistically significant abnormal returns on four subcomposite portfolios. They were tangible tier 1 risk based leverage ratio and tier 1 riskbased capital ratio within group 2, and tier 1 leverage ratio and Tobin’s q within group 3.
Similarly to the previous events, higher leveraged BHC’s and those with seemingly higher
quality assets experienced positive abnormal returns. This reaction can be held in similar
regard to the reaction to event two. The arrival of the final rules, although not public, can
be seen as a reduction in overall regulatory risk—as the fact that the BCBS has reached
some form of a final product and those banks with the highest regulatory risk benefit most
definitively from a reduction in such.
Event four failed to yield any cumulative abnormal return, despite the release of the
final regulatory details. This response, or rather lack thereof, posits that investors already
adopted viewpoints on how Basel III would affect BHC valuation. When the final details
were released, some evidence of meaningful perversions of expected trading paths remain,
however such evidence is minimal. Until the final costs of compliance are calculated,
investor sentiment on the effect of Basel III will not be corroborated. From the lack of
reaction or regulatory details we can more easily draw conclusions about investor

26

confidence, not effectiveness in synthetization. Only a single sub-composite portfolio
experienced abnormal returns—tangible tier 1 leverage ratio’s group two. Perhaps simply
a continuation of event three’s reaction to the portfolio, as no discernable pattern can
reasonably be rendered from this single measure.
Event Five continued to showcase confidence on behalf of investors. This study
brought no evidence of statistically significant returns, either cumulatively or within a subcomposite portfolio, at the release of the final rules. Investor apathy is certainly not the
most salient understanding of this reaction. Given the volatility of bank valuation in prior
sub-events, banking valuations already changed their expected trading contour in order to
incorporate relevant Basel III items. The affirmations of capitalization requirements
presented no such material information to move equity values of BHC’s. This finding does
not imply that the final rules failed to have a material effect on banking valuations, as
reactions of previous events would suggest otherwise. Moreover, the ultimate effect of
Basel III’s final rules might not be inconsequential. A visceral reaction on behalf of
investors could be perceptually substituted with the aggregate effect of the regulation
transpiring over longer-term trading windows as investors come to gain an organic
understanding of its implications. This notion invites future research.
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VII. Conclusion
Much of what makes the study of regulatory networks compelling is their
undeniable importance and need to incorporate conjectural components into any desired
outcome. The existence of the regulator’s dilemma alone invites practitioners to understand
potential wealth transfers between constituents of regulatory frameworks. These transfers
can occur within a closed system, or it can be delivered from an exogenous force.
This event study discovered that the sub-events comprising the release of Basel III
constitute a salient gateway to the emotionality of investors. With sentiments shaken in the
financial crisis, investors scrambled to adjust valuations to reflect riskiness of the
marketplace—one which bolstered regulatory risk as a lasting constraint. American BHC’s
seemed to brace for a detrimental blow to equity value, before rallying on the understanding
that the group of banks would benefit from its current position of regulatory stringency.
Basel III was perceived to increase American bank value through its establishment of a
more stable international banking system. Although future earnings robustness is
ultimately dampened through heightened capitalization requirements, American banks
operating within a fundamentally stronger global marketplace is certainly helpful.
However, the beneficial distributional effects of the costs of compliance presents a more
likely explanation of our results.
This study is limited in that it relies heavily on theoretical conjecture to render
understandings about bank equity valuation in the wake of extreme downward volatility.
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A relatively short trading window attempts to capture the visceral reactions prompted by
the regulatory fallout. While this fallout can certainly be detected, knowing the absolute
motivations behind this trading activity will remain somewhat speculative. Future research
will hopefully demystify some degree of this speculation.
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IX. Appendix
Table 1- Event Timing Details
Event
Number

Event
Description

BCBS
Meeting Date

1
2
3
4
5

Agreement to Negotiate
Preliminary Proposals
Announcement of Final Rules
Minimum Levels Release
Final Rules Release

2009 Sept 6
2009 December 8-9
2010 July 14 - 15
2010 Sept 12
2010 Nov 30 - Dec 1

BCBS Press
Release Date
2009 Sept 7
2009 Dec 17
2010 Jul 26
2010 Sep 12
2010 Dec 16

Days Between
Meeting and Release

Regulatory
Details (Y/N)

1
8
11
0
15

No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes

Figure 1 – Capitalization Changes
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Table 2 – List of BHC’s
Ticker

Company Name

Ticker

Company Name

NasdaqGS:SRCE
NasdaqGS:ABCB
NYSE:BAC
NYSE:BOH
NasdaqCM:BMRC
NasdaqGS:OZRK
NasdaqGS:BANR
NYSE:BBT
NasdaqGS:BBCN
NasdaqGS:BPFH
NasdaqGS:BMTC
NasdaqGS:CCBG
NYSE:COF
NasdaqCM:CACB
NasdaqGS:CATY
NasdaqGS:CSFL
NasdaqCM:CFCB
NasdaqGS:CNBK.A
NYSE:C
NasdaqCM:CZNC
NasdaqGS:CCNE
NasdaqGS:COLB
NYSE:CMA
NasdaqGS:CBSH
NasdaqCM:COB
NasdaqGS:CNOB
NasdaqCM:EGBN
NasdaqGS:EWBC
NYSE:FNB
NasdaqGS:FITB
NasdaqGS:FISI
NasdaqGS:FBNC
NYSE:FBP
NasdaqGS:BUSE
NasdaqGS:FCNC.A
NasdaqGS:FFBC
NYSE:FHN
NasdaqGS:FMBI
NasdaqGS:FUNC
NasdaqGS:FMER
NasdaqGS:GABC
NasdaqGS:GBCI
NasdaqGS:GSBC
NasdaqGS:GBNK
NasdaqGS:HMPR
NasdaqGS:HBHC
NasdaqGS:HTLF
NasdaqGS:HTBK
NasdaqGS:HFWA
NasdaqGS:HOMB
NasdaqGS:HBNC
NasdaqGS:HBAN
NasdaqGS:IBKC
NasdaqGS:INDB
NasdaqGS:IBCP
NYSE:JPM

1st Source Corporation
Ameris Bancorp
Bank of America Corporation
Bank of Hawaii Corporation
Bank of Marin Bancorp
Bank of the Ozarks, Inc.
Banner Corporation
BB&T Corporation
BBCN Bancorp, Inc.
Boston Private Financial Holdings, Inc.
Bryn Mawr Bank Corp.
Capital City Bank Group Inc.
Capital One Financial Corporation
Cascade Bancorp
Cathay General Bancorp
CenterState Banks, Inc.
Centrue Financial Corporation
Century Bancorp Inc.
Citigroup Inc.
Citizens & Northern Corp.
CNB Financial Corp.
Columbia Banking System Inc.
Comerica Incorporated
Commerce Bancshares, Inc.
CommunityOne Bancorp
ConnectOne Bancorp, Inc.
Eagle Bancorp, Inc.
East West Bancorp, Inc.
F.N.B. Corporation
Fifth Third Bancorp
Financial Institutions Inc.
First Bancorp
First Bancorp
First Busey Corporation
First Citizens Bancshares Inc.
First Financial Bancorp.
First Horizon National Corporation
First Midwest Bancorp Inc.
First United Corporation
FirstMerit Corporation
German American Bancorp Inc.
Glacier Bancorp, Inc.
Great Southern Bancorp Inc.
Guaranty Bancorp
Hampton Roads Bankshares Inc.
Hancock Holding Company
Heartland Financial USA, Inc.
Heritage Commerce Corp.
Heritage Financial Corporation
Home Bancshares, Inc. (Conway, AR)
Horizon Bancorp
Huntington Bancshares Incorporated
IberiaBank Corp.
Independent Bank Corp.
Independent Bank Corporation
JPMorgan Chase & Co.

NYSE:KEY
NasdaqGS:LKFN
NYSE:MTB
NasdaqGS:MCBC
NasdaqGS:MBFI
NasdaqGS:MBTF
NasdaqGS:MBWM
NasdaqGS:MBVT
NasdaqGS:NPBC
NasdaqGS:NBTB
NasdaqGS:NTRS
NasdaqGS:NRIM
NasdaqCM:ORRF
NasdaqGS:PCBK
NasdaqGS:PMBC
AMEX:PRK
NasdaqGS:PGC
NasdaqGS:PNFP
NasdaqGS:BPOP
NYSE:PB
NYSE:RF
NasdaqGS:STBA
NasdaqGS:SASR
NasdaqGS:SBCF
NasdaqGS:BSRR
NasdaqGS:SFNC
NasdaqGS:SSB
NasdaqGS:SBSI
NasdaqGS:SYBT
NYSE:SCNB
NasdaqGS:SNBC
NYSE:STI
NasdaqGS:SIVB
NYSE:SNV
NYSE:TCB
NasdaqGS:TCBI
NYSE:BK
NYSE:SCHW
NasdaqGS:FNLC
NYSE:PNC
NasdaqGS:TOWN
NasdaqGS:TCBK
NasdaqGS:TRMK
NYSE:USB
NasdaqGS:UMBF
NasdaqGS:UMPQ
NasdaqGS:UBSH
NasdaqGS:UBSI
NasdaqGS:UCBI
NYSE:VLY
NasdaqGS:WASH
NasdaqGS:WSBF
NYSE:WBS
NYSE:WFC
NasdaqGS:WABC
NYSE:WAL
NasdaqGS:ZION

KeyCorp.
Lakeland Financial Corp.
M&T Bank Corporation
Macatawa Bank Corp.
MB Financial Inc.
MBT Financial Corp.
Mercantile Bank Corp.
Merchants Bancshares Inc.
National Penn Bancshares Inc.
NBT Bancorp, Inc.
Northern Trust Corporation
Northrim Bancorp Inc.
Orrstown Financial Services Inc.
Pacific Continental Corp.
Pacific Mercantile Bancorp
Park National Corp.
Peapack-Gladstone Financial Corp.
Pinnacle Financial Partners Inc.
Popular, Inc.
Prosperity Bancshares Inc.
Regions Financial Corporation
S&T Bancorp Inc.
Sandy Spring Bancorp Inc.
Seacoast Banking Corp. of Florida
Sierra Bancorp
Simmons First National Corporation
South State Corporation
Southside Bancshares Inc.
Stock Yards Bancorp, Inc.
Suffolk Bancorp
Sun Bancorp Inc.
SunTrust Banks, Inc.
SVB Financial Group
Synovus Financial Corporation
TCF Financial Corporation
Texas Capital BancShares Inc.
The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation
The Charles Schwab Corporation
The First Bancorp, Inc.
The PNC Financial Services Group, Inc.
Towne Bank
TriCo Bancshares
Trustmark Corporation
U.S. Bancorp
UMB Financial Corporation
Umpqua Holdings Corporation
Union Bankshares Corporation
United Bankshares Inc.
United Community Banks, Inc.
Valley National Bancorp
Washington Trust Bancorp Inc.
Waterstone Financial, Inc.
Webster Financial Corp.
Wells Fargo & Company
Westamerica Bancorp.
Western Alliance Bancorporation
Zions Bancorporation
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Table 3 – Capitalization Group Criteria
Ratio

Group 1

Group 2

Group 3

Tier 1 Leverage Ratio

< .08

.08-.10

>.10

Tangible Tier 1 Leverage Ratio

< .09

.09-.12

>.12

Tier 1 Risk-based Capital Ratio

< .12

.12-.15

>.15

Risk-weighted Assets / Total Consolidated Assets

< .75

.75-.80

>.80

Tobin's q

<. 97

.97-1.02

>1.02

Table 4 – Results for all BHC’s across All Events
Composite Portfolio Across Events

All Banks

All Events

0.0014
0.082

Event 1

-0.0043
0.012

Event 2

0.0048
0.010

Event 3

0.0027
0.114

Event 4

0.0016
0.357

Event 5

0.0018
0.307

The above statistics show the βj as a result of the GLS regression with the corresponding p-value below.
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Table 5 – Grouped BHC’s across All Events
Composite Portfolios - All Events

Group 1

Group 2

Group 3

Tier 1 Leverage Ratio

0.0012
0.617

0.0008
0.442

0.0020
0.054

Tangible Tier 1 Leverage Ratio

0.0006
0.677

0.0017
0.084

0.0036
0.041

Tier 1 Risk-based Capital Ratio

0.0004
0.789

0.0021
0.010

0.0024
0.071

Risk-weighted Assets / Total Consolidated Assets

0.0018
0.063

0.0018
0.067

0.0002
0.880

Tobin's q

0.0014
0.496

0.0012
0.289

0.0019
0.052

The above statistics show the βj as a result of the GLS regression with the corresponding p-value below.

Table 6 – Grouped BHC’s, Event One
Sub-composite Portfolios - Event One

Group 1

Group 2

Group 3

Tier 1 Leverage Ratio

-0.0055
0.290

-0.0037
0.091

-0.0055
0.026

Tangible Tier 1 Leverage Ratio

-0.0053
0.067

-0.0051
0.018

0.0033
0.542

Tier 1 Risk-based Capital Ratio

-0.0040
0.198

-0.0081
0.010

0.0057
0.262

Risk-weighted Assets / Total Consolidated Assets

-0.0031
0.213

-0.0039
0.397

-0.0071
0.011

Tobin's q

-0.0039
0.307

-0.0056
0.052

-0.0040
0.061

The above statistics show the βj as a result of the GLS regression with the corresponding p-value below.
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Table 7 – Grouped BHC’s, Event Two
Sub-composite Portfolios - Event Two

Group 1

Group 2

Group 3

Tier 1 Leverage Ratio

0.0058
0.303

0.0030
0.161

0.0075
0.002

Tangible Tier 1 Leverage Ratio

0.0043
0.151

0.0039
0.075

0.0114
0.004

Tier 1 Risk-based Capital Ratio

0.0027
0.404

0.0062
0.010

0.0101
0.010

Risk-weighted Assets / Total Consolidated Assets

0.0063
0.010

0.0035
0.422

0.0038
0.201

Tobin's q

0.0013
0.736

0.0076
0.007

0.0083
0.001

The above statistics show the βj as a result of the GLS regression with the corresponding p-value below.

Table 8 – Grouped BHC’s, Event Three
Sub-composite Portfolios - Event Three

Group 1

Group 2

Group 3

Tier 1 Leverage Ratio

-0.0006
0.915

0.0035
0.133

0.0039
0.079

Tangible Tier 1 Leverage Ratio

0.0013
0.673

0.0044
0.047

0.0036
0.321

Tier 1 Risk-based Capital Ratio

0.0010
0.794

0.0058
0.01

0.0012
0.637

Risk-weighted Assets / Total Consolidated Assets

0.0021
0.297

0.0061
0.245

0.0032
0.378

Tobin's q

0.0060
0.234

-0.0001
0.967

0.0052
0.020

The above statistics show the βj as a result of the GLS regression with the corresponding p-value below.

36

Table 9 – Grouped BHC’s, Event Four
Sub-composite Portfolios - Event Four

Group 1

Group 2

Group 3

Tier 1 Leverage Ratio

0.0015
0.773

0.0004
0.879

0.0029
0.187

Tangible Tier 1 Leverage Ratio

0.0002
0.944

0.0042
0.056

-0.0009
0.813

Tier 1 Risk-based Capital Ratio

0.0004
0.91

0.0032
0.15

0.0015
0.564

Risk-weighted Assets / Total Consolidated Assets

0.0020
0.338

0.0020
0.709

0.0013
0.72

Tobin's q

0.0028
0.574

0.0016
0.466

0.0012
0.614

The above statistics show the βj as a result of the GLS regression with the corresponding p-value below.

Table 10 – Grouped BHC’s, Event Five
Sub-composite Portfolios - Event Five

Group 1

Group 2

Group 3

Tier 1 Leverage Ratio

0.0057
0.295

0.0008
0.731

0.0006
0.791

Tangible Tier 1 Leverage Ratio

0.0028
0.371

0.0013
0.55

0.0013
0.727

Tier 1 Risk-based Capital Ratio

0.0034
0.381

0.0021
0.349

-0.0003
0.904

Risk-weighted Assets / Total Consolidated Assets

0.0013
0.513

0.0022
0.666

0.0039
0.98

Tobin's q

0.0049
0.366

0.0020
0.382

-0.0005
0.774

The above statistics show the βj as a result of the GLS regression with the corresponding p-value below.
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